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Reflections of the Holland Medal Recipient
PERILS OF TAX REFORM
James R. Hines Jr.

Tax reforms dangle possibilities of improving the tax system, but are fraught with
perils that are evident from the 2017 U.S. experience and caution against frequent
reforms of its ilk. The first peril is that reforms containing tax provisions selected
simply on the basis of their projected revenue contributions will produce less tax
revenue than anticipated, illustrative calculations suggesting shortfalls of roughly
8–16 percent. The second peril is that reforms will not advance the objectives of
efficiency and tax equity to the extent that they include provisions intended to influence future tax legislation or government spending. The third peril is that reforms
designed without sufficient appreciation of transitional gains and losses will offer
inadequate and misdirected transition relief. And the fourth peril is that reforms
stoke expectations of future tax changes, discouraging investment and encouraging
costly tax avoidance. Tax reforms that apply sound principles will reduce or even
avoid these perils.
Keywords: tax reform, revenue forecasting, transition relief, tax avoidance
JEL Codes: H21, K34

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he passage of major U.S. federal tax legislation in 2017 affords an opportunity to
reflect on the good and bad to be had when a government significantly changes
its country’s taxes. The good is obvious: properly crafted, reform measures have the
potential to remake a country’s tax system into a more efficient and equitable method of
financing government, thereby obtaining needed revenue at the lowest possible cost to
society. The bad is not only obvious but alas evident: improperly crafted reform measures
worsen economic performance by creating inefficient incentives, reduce the extent to
which tax burdens correspond to ability to pay, and diminish the government’s ability
to finance its expenditures. While it is tempting to offer a critical normative assessment
of specific components of the 2017 U.S. legislation, it is perhaps more useful to attempt
James R. Hines Jr.: Department of Economics, University of Michigan, and National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA, USA (jrhines@umich.edu)

358

National Tax Journal

to rise ever so slightly above the fray by considering the widespread and consequential
pathologies to which tax reform efforts, in 2017 and at other times, are subject, and
how they might be avoided.
Tax reform efforts consistently fall short in four areas, of which the first is that postreform tax collections fail to meet expectations, reflecting systematic positive bias in
revenue forecasts. The second problem area is that reforms by design do not offer efficient and equitable methods of collecting taxes, because they are crafted with more than
just these objectives in mind. The third problem area is that tax reforms inadequately
treat the windfall gains and losses that accompany transitions from pre-reform tax
systems. And the fourth problem area is that tax reforms enacted on a frequent basis
create expectations of subsequent reforms, which discourage efficient investment and
encourage inefficient tax avoidance.
Given the political reality that tax cuts spread more joy than do tax increases, mistakenly optimistic revenue forecasts enable the assembly of reform packages that include
too little in the way of revenue-raising provisions and too much in the way of tax cuts.
This happens when legislators choose portions of their reform provisions simply to
meet revenue targets. Since new tax laws have uncertain effects on tax collections, it is
necessary to estimate the revenue effects of potential tax changes, a job that is performed
by skilled professional staff. Deployed properly, the estimates can be used to fine-tune
tax rates and other provisions to meet budget goals; but if instead staff are tasked with
producing revenue estimates for hundreds of possible revenue raisers, and legislators
choose to include in tax legislation those provisions with unusually high revenue forecasts,
then this method of selecting on forecast residuals introduces positive bias. This happens
despite the unbiasedness of individual forecasts made by staff, and despite the volitional
innocence of legislators, who are unaware (though perhaps in many cases would also
be uncaring) of what their actions do to the statistical properties of the resulting budget
estimates. Tax reforms designed in such an unprincipled way are unlikely to produce
sufficient subsequent tax revenue, necessitating future tax increases or spending cuts.
The second problem area is that legislatures enact today’s tax reform with more than
just today’s taxes in mind. Tax provisions have a way of persisting for long periods,
even in the face of subsequent reforms. Consequently, tax cuts change the baselines
for future tax policies, making it that much more difficult for governments to collect
revenue in the future. Many believe that this dynamic depresses future government
spending — which is why tax cuts are particularly popular among small-government
advocates, whereas tax increases are relatively more popular among big-government
advocates. Similarly, changes in the distribution of tax burdens between groups such
as the rich and poor, individuals and businesses, and income earners and those who
spend or bequeath, tend to persist and therefore affect tax policies well into the future.
Forward-looking legislators, who anticipate that changing political tides will someday
give power to others (including those in their own parties) who might not share their
visions, typically try to craft reforms that position the tax system to mitigate and withstand the impacts of likely future changes. This commonly entails overshooting, such as
cutting taxes more than would otherwise be desirable, and directing tax cuts too heavily
toward favored groups, in the hope that future changes will offset only a portion of
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these changes. Such provisions need bear little resemblance to those that would make
the tax system truly efficient and equitable — and not surprisingly, since the laudable
goals of efficiency and equity can be met only by those who seek them in the first place.
Significant unanticipated tax changes produce windfall gains for some taxpayers and
windfall losses for others, thereby raising the third problem for tax reform, which is what,
if anything, to do about these transitional gains and losses. Optimal tax theory, which
focuses almost exclusively on the design of steady state tax policies, offers precious
little practical guidance. Reform legislation occasionally acknowledges the problem of
transitions by phasing in new provisions or grandfathering prior transactions, seemingly
on ad hoc bases. But a starting place for transitional policy must be to understand its
goals and what policies advance them, without which governments risk undermining
the objectives that motivate tax reforms in the first place.
The fourth problem area is that expectations of future tax reforms affect incentives
for current economic behavior, so to the extent that reform efforts change expectations
over the frequency or likely directions of future tax reforms they will influence contemporaneous economic activities, often inefficiently. For example, reforms that impose
heavy tax burdens on firms with extensive fixed investments are likely to discourage
such investments, even if tax reforms are designed to burden only older investments —
since today’s and tomorrow’s investments will be old when tax reform next happens.
Tax reforms similarly change tax compliance and avoidance, commonly obtaining
revenue by reducing or eliminating certain identified tax avoidance opportunities. These
loophole-closing reform measures have the perverse effect of encouraging taxpayers to
devote resources to developing new tax avoidance techniques to replace the ones lost
in reform, and to rush to implement any new methods before they are disallowed in a
subsequent reform. Consequently, a fast pace of tax reform need not enhance efficiency,
despite the benefits of quickly removing avoidance opportunities, since the process of
updating and improving tax rules gives taxpayers inefficient incentives.
One should not infer from this litany of woes that the tax system should never be
reformed; the fact that something is expensive implies only that one should verify its
worth before taking the plunge. Furthermore, knowledge of reform pitfalls affords the
opportunity to avoid them or at least minimize their impact — and the way to do this is
to enact reforms that flow from sound principles of tax design. There are many benefits
to be had in improving the U.S. tax system, but in order to realize these benefits it is
necessary to pass well-reasoned and carefully crafted legislation that raises revenue
efficiently and equitably. Tax reforms occur infrequently because they are politically
costly, so a major reform that does not deliver considerable social and economic value
is properly deemed a failure. With adherence to good principles there can be far fewer
failures in the future.
II. TAX REVENUE: THE SOFT UNDERBELLY OF TAX REFORM
Governments must finance their tax reforms, despite finding it distasteful and politically inconvenient to do so. This is not to say that tax reforms are universally, or even
usually, revenue-neutral; but it is an inescapable truth that any revenue shortfalls that
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accompany tax reforms must be compensated with subsequent tax increases or spending reductions. Consequently, even during a period of political dysfunction there can
be considerable political pressure to limit any revenue losses produced by tax reforms,
notwithstanding the reality that tax cuts are always more fun than tax increases. To
the extent that tax reforms proceed on the basis of guiding principles, these principles
typically dictate tax cuts, requiring revenue raisers to be attached as afterthoughts to
tax reform legislation. And as is so often the case with afterthoughts, these revenue
raising provisions need not embody sound principles or careful design — nor are they
apt to live up to their promises.
In a typical reform scenario, the legislature seeks to implement tax measures projected
to reduce tax collections, and finds it necessary to add revenue raisers to compensate for
part or all of the lost revenue. There is usually considerable uncertainty over the true
tax revenue consequences of various components of proposed tax legislation, since tax
revenues depend on the performance of the economy and the behavior of taxpayers, both
of which are difficult to forecast and will usually be influenced by the legislation itself.
As a result, legislatures turn to specialists for revenue forecasts, or “scores,” associated
with individual tax reform provisions, trusting that the inevitable forecast inaccuracies
will roughly balance on the positive and negative sides, producing revenue projections
that serve as reliable guides to policy formation.1
Alas this confidence in accustomed methods of projecting tax collections is misplaced,
as the methods run afoul of the practices of the legislators themselves, who often unwittingly bias the projections. This happens whenever revenue raising provisions are chosen
in part or in whole on the basis of their estimated revenue contributions, since such a
process effectively selects on the residuals of the revenue estimating equations. As a
result of this selection, the relevant forecast errors are no longer unbiased, but instead
have positive expected values, implying that reform packages are unlikely to produce
the anticipated tax revenue.
To illustrate this process, consider a case in which legislators wish to cut certain taxes
but are concerned that their desired cuts, taken together, would too severely reduce tax
collections, making the reform appear to be fiscally irresponsible. Consequently they
decide to include in the tax reform package various revenue raisers chosen not on the
basis of their desirable properties but instead simply to provide offsetting projected tax
revenues at tolerable political cost. Legislators do not know in advance the revenue
consequences of possible alternatives, so they submit a large number of such provisions
to the scoring agency for evaluation. For each provision the scoring agency provides a
revenue forecast that is the sum of true expected revenue and a forecast error. Legislators
then include in the tax reform package a limited number of these provisions, chosen on
the basis of revenue forecasts.
It is useful first to consider a case in which a potential tax provision’s true expected
tax revenue is either one or else a value far less than one, possibly including negative
1

Auerbach (1994, 1999) analyzes the general properties of U.S. government tax revenue forecasts; Gentry
(1989), Feenberg et al. (1989), Cassidy, Kamlet, and Nagin (1989), and Bretschneider and Gorr (1992)
consider the properties of state government tax revenue forecasts, and Buettner and Kauder (2010) review
the tax revenue forecasting experiences of other countries.
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values. Forecast errors are unbiased, uncorrelated, and uniformly distributed over the
range  –α , α  , so the distribution of forecasted revenues from potential tax reform
provisions that in fact yield significant positive tax revenue is uniform in the range
1– α ,1 + α  . Assume that upon learning their revenue scores the legislature loses
interest in any of the genuinely low-yielding provisions, and that out of the remaining
N high-yielding (true revenue of one) provisions for which it has scores it chooses to
include a smaller number n for inclusion in the final tax reform, these n having received
the highest scores from the revenue forecasting agency. It greatly simplifies the statistical properties of the outcome to treat the numbers n and N as being chosen without
regard to the magnitude of revenue forecasts, as would be the case if the legislature
feels that it can request only N scores, and should include exactly n revenue raisers,
with government borrowing adjusting to absorb any resulting revenue surpluses or
shortfalls.
Despite the unbiasedness of forecasts of individual revenue provisions, the legislature’s method of choosing the composition of the tax reform package clearly biases the
aggregate revenue forecast, since provisions are chosen on the basis of high forecast
errors. In order statistics the “selection differential” is the difference between the mean
of a selected sample and the mean of the distribution from which the sample is taken.2
With this uniform distribution of forecast errors and an expected revenue of unity,
the expected selection differential when choosing only the largest n elements out of a
sample of N is:
(1)

α ( N − n)

( N + 1)

.

True average expected tax revenue is unity, so average forecasted revenue is

(
(

)

 α N −n 
1 +
 . It follows that the ratio, r, of the expected selection differential to
N + 1 

expected projected tax revenue is:

)

α ( N − n)

(2)

ρ=

( N + 1) =
α
.
 α ( N − n)  

1  
1+
1 +
( N + 1)  α +   N   




2


n  
 1−  
N  


See, for example, Burrows (1972) and Andrews (1996), both of which report variants of equation (1). The
theory of order statistics has produced closed form expressions for the selection differential only for the
uniform and exponential distributions, but several studies report the results of numerical simulations used
to estimate selection differentials for normal distributions with selected values of n and N.
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Equation (2) offers several lessons, the first of which is a reminder that if n = N then
r = 0, as tax provisions would then not be selected on the basis of tax revenue forecast
residuals. For a given number n of enacted tax provisions, r increases with N, ultimately
α
approaching the value
as N increases without limit — reflecting the expectation
(1 + α )
that all n of the chosen tax provisions will then have maximal forecast errors. And it is
n
is held constant, as a larger sample size
noteworthy that r increases with N even if
N
increases the opportunities for selection.

Equation (2) can be used to calculate the expected forecast errors for representative
cases. It is instructive to consider the case of a = 0.25, for which true expected revenue
from a tax provision is unity, but forecasts are drawn from a uniform distribution over
the range [0.75, 1.25]. If the legislature submits 20 high-yielding tax provisions for
evaluation, and chooses to include in the tax reform package the ten with the highest
forecasted revenues, then n = 10, N = 20, and r = 0.106, implying that expected actual
tax revenues are 10.6 percent less than forecasted tax revenues. Keeping a = 0.25 and
n = 10, but increasing N to 50, raises the value of r to 16.4 percent, reflecting a greater
degree of selection on forecasting residuals, and moving r a good deal of the way toward
its theoretical upper bound (as N increases without limit) of 20 percent.
The example with uniform forecast errors is based on the assumptions that the distribution of true expected tax revenue is strongly bimodal, and that the legislature is
therefore able to use forecasted tax revenue to distinguish tax provisions that are likely
to generate significant tax revenue from those that are not, and then chooses among
the genuinely effective revenue-generating provisions. Another possibility is that true
expected tax revenue has the same distribution as the forecast errors, and that the legislature in selecting those provisions with the highest forecasted tax revenue effectively
chooses a combination of provisions with high genuine revenue-producing potential
and those with the greatest forecast errors.
It is valuable to consider cases in which the legislature cannot distinguish forecast
errors from true differences in expected tax revenue potential, but in order to make
this exercise tractable it is necessary to assume that true revenue potential and forecast
errors are both normally distributed. If expected tax revenue and the forecast errors both
have normal distributions with the same standard deviation as the forecast errors in the
prior example,3 then from Burrows (1972) the resulting value of r when n = 10 and N
= 20 is 15.7 percent — though this calculation treats all of the uncertainty as though it
comes from forecast errors. In expectation half of the uncertainty is attributable to true
expected tax revenue and only half to forecast errors, so the expected forecast error
component is just 7.8 percent, implying that tax revenue is expected to be 7.8 percent
3

The uniform distribution [0.75, 1.25] has a standard deviation of 0.144338, and the sum of two normal
distributions with this standard deviation is a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 0.20412.
The product of this number and the values reported in Table 1 of Burrows (1972, p. 1096) produces the
figures in the text.
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less than the forecasted level. A similar calculation with n = 10 and N = 50 yields an
implication that tax revenue is expected to be 14.0 percent less than the forecasted level.
It is clear that selecting tax reform provisions on the basis of revenue forecasts produces biased aggregate tax revenue projections. Furthermore, these calculations using
forecast errors drawn from uniform and normal distributions take the values of n and N
to be independent of the revenue forecasts, which will often not be the case, as legislators may have fixed revenue targets that they try to meet with as few revenue-raisers as
possible, so will choose to increase N if early forecasts are disappointing, and reduce
n upon receiving favorable revenue forecasts. Such practices only increase the bias in
resulting aggregate revenue forecasts, as they have the effect of increasing the degree to
which provisions are selected on forecasting errors. The reality that tax revenue forecasting is an imperfect science need not create upward bias in aggregate revenue forecasts,
and indeed there are circumstances in which forecasts can be downward biased, such
as when legislators adjust tax rates and other features to raise a fixed amount of tax
revenue from each of several tax provisions, so effectively rely less on provisions with
positive revenue forecast errors. But when the tax reform process includes a desperate
search for revenue raisers largely without regard to their contributions to efficiency and
tax equity, choices are distorted in the direction of including provisions that produce
overly optimistic revenue forecasts.
Revenue collection is the primary function of the tax system, so there is reason to
be concerned about shortfalls that accompany tax reforms. The government budget
constraint, viewed merely as a constraint, is rather forgiving, making it perhaps too
easily ignored in the short run. As a result, governments can and do run chronic budget
deficits, although legislators quite correctly worry that there is something amiss when
they collectively fail to pay their bills. Consequently the fiscal imbalances created by
choosing tax provisions simply to satisfy budget targets rather than to advance tax
policy objectives adds to the list of potentially unfortunate results of the tax reform
process. With tax reform provisions instead chosen on the basis of their contributions
to efficiency and tax equity rather than their apparent contributions to revenue, there is
far less scope for upward bias in the resulting revenue forecasts, and more reason to be
optimistic about the budgetary as well as economic effects of tax reform.
III. FUTURE GAMES
No single tax reform is the end of the line; any reform today will be supplanted by
an unending sequence of future reforms. Wise politicians anticipate political moods
change, others will someday take their places, and that when these newcomers are in
charge they are apt to enact new legislation based on objectives that differ from those
of current legislators. Politicians who care about the future, either because they have
principles or because their supporters do, anticipate that everything they enact can be
overturned by subsequent legislation, so will seek to influence the course of future
events through the measures they put in place today.
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This process can be analyzed by specifying that current legislators evaluate the welfare
impact of a period t tax rate τ t with a function W τ t , and that these legislators incur
political costs φ τ t , τ t −1 in using the tax reform process to select a period t tax rate that
differs from the tax rate in period (t – 1). Furthermore, current legislators care about
the discounted present value of future welfare created by tax rates in future periods,
albeit without regard to any political costs incurred by future politicians. It follows that
period t legislators seek to maximize
(3)

(

)

( ) (

)

( )

( )

S

( )

W τ t − φ τ t , τ t −1 + ∑ β sW τ t + s ,
s =1

in which 1 > b > 0 is a discount factor and S is the number of future periods over which
legislators have preferences. The first order condition characterizing the maximum of
equation (3) over the choice of tt is
(4)

( )

W ′ τt −

(

∂φ τ t ,τ t −1
∂τ t

)+

S

∑ β W ′ (τ )
s=1

s

t +s

∂τ t + s
= 0.
∂τ t

Forward-looking governments choose tax reform provisions that satisfy equation
(4). Consequently, if period t legislators use a function W τ t that corresponds to
true national welfare, then they will enact a tax reform that maximizes current period
welfare (and thus sets W ′ τ t = 0 ) only if the second and third terms of equation (4)
sum to zero. The second term is the political cost of changing today’s tax rate, whereas
the third term is the effect of today’s tax rate on the discounted present value of future
welfare through its impact on future tax rates. It is clear that political costs have the
potential to impede welfare-improving tax policy development, as these costs will
often discourage the refinement and adoption of reforms that otherwise would have
made positive welfare contributions. And the desire to use today’s tax rate to influence
future taxes leads governments to adopt tax reform provisions that differ from those
they would choose with today’s welfare in mind.
There are two components to these future considerations as captured in the third term
∂τ
of equation (4), the first of which is t + s , the effect of today’s tax rate on the tax rate s
∂τ t
periods ahead. Clearly, if this term is zero for all values of s then the current tax rate
has no effect on future rates, and legislators will choose tax policies today based on
today’s costs and benefits. The second component is W ′ τ t + s , the effect of a tax change
s periods ahead on welfare in that period. Here too zero is a critical value: If today’s
legislators anticipate that future tax policies are optimal (implying that W ′ τ t + s = 0 for
all s) then the third term in equation (4) becomes zero, and future considerations should
be unimportant to those who make today’s tax policy choices. It is only to the extent that
legislators expect future tax policies systematically to deviate from those that maximize
welfare, as reflected in a value of W ′ τ t + s that differs significantly from zero, that
governments will have incentives to use today’s tax reform to influence future taxes.

( )

( )

( )

( )

( )
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Small-government advocates have long relied on a version of equation (4) to justify
current tax cuts at the expense of greater government deficits, reflecting a belief that the
resulting combination of higher government interest payments and lower future baseline
taxes limits the ability of future legislatures to increase government size.4 The incentive
to distort current taxes to influence future events reflects both the government’s inability
to commit to future tax policies and an expectation that future tax policies may differ
from those which the current government deems desirable. Current tax policies can
influence future taxes even without affecting government deficits, as there are several
political channels through which policies once in place have a way of persisting despite
the potential for Pareto-improving reforms.5 Current tax policy constitutes the baseline
against which reform possibilities are judged, so one reason to change current taxes is
that doing so indirectly affects future taxes.
It is difficult to enact sound tax reforms, and harder still when governments craft
their tax policies in part as positioning for the future. The combination of intertemporal tax policy dependence and belief that future taxes will be systematically skewed
in undesirable directions gives legislators incentives to create future tax baselines that
are more to their liking. The resulting policy commonly overshoots its objectives: if
current legislators worry that a future government will tax the wealthy too heavily they
have incentives to cut top-bracket tax rates more than they otherwise would, relying
on the costs of abruptly raising rates to dampen the magnitudes of future tax increases.
If it were possible for current legislators to negotiate binding agreements with future
governments, there would be no need for these tax policy distortions, and a semblance
of efficiency could be restored even in the face of partisan policy disagreements — but
alas no such agreements are possible. As a result each new tax reform, particularly one
4

5

Persson and Svensson (1989) provide a formal development of the point that a conservative government
will use tax cuts and the resulting government deficit as instruments to exert partial control over future
governments. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) identify circumstances in
which both liberal and conservative governments will expand government deficits to constrain the future
actions of their political opponents. Poterba (1998) calls attention to the role of political considerations
in tax determination, and Buchanan (1967) offers a behavioral interpretation of the effect of current tax
policies on future taxes and spending, noting that governments are apt to spend funds that are available
without taking explicit legislative action, so expenditure programs funded with previously-enacted taxes
whose revenues increase disproportionately in economic expansions will then grow as a fraction of the
economy. The evidence is mixed: Oates (1975) and Musgrave (1981) report that government expenditures
of states with highly income-elastic taxes grew particularly rapidly during economic expansions, but Romer
and Romer (2009) find no evidence that U.S. tax cuts depress subsequent U.S. government spending. It
should be noted that, given the political costs of increasing taxes, small-government advocates may be
better able to apply equation (4) to overshoot their objectives than are big-government advocates.
Besley and Coate (1998) note that a government’s inability to commit to future policies restricts its ability
to compensate those affected by policy changes and thereby limits the scope of potential reforms. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) emphasize that uncertainty over the identities of potential beneficiaries reduces
the likelihood that a welfare-enhancing reform would be supported by the median voter. And Coate and
Morris (1999) call attention to cases such as tax credits that require private actors to invest in order to
obtain benefits, after which investors are willing to devote additional political resources to preserving the
policies, reducing the likelihood and scope of subsequent reforms.
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enacted without bipartisan support, brings provisions designed not only to collect taxes
but also to influence and constrain the future collection of taxes. Tax reforms enacted
instead on the basis of shared principles, or better still bipartisan support, will have far
fewer of these unattractive features, and therefore over the course of the political cycle
contain provisions that enhance the welfares of all taxpayers.
IV. TRANSITION RELIEF IN STARK RELIEF
Tax reforms commonly produce not only winners but also losers, as despite their
average tendency to improve welfare the resulting realignments of tax burdens and
changes to market prices have broad and diverse consequences. Legislators naturally
prefer to avoid adopting policies that negatively impact important groups in society,
which is why they are inclined toward tax reforms that disfavor less politically powerful
segments of the population such as future generations, and why tax reforms commonly
include transition relief designed to mitigate certain negative impacts over the short to
medium run. This form of transition relief includes one-time gestures such as phasing
in new tax rules, “grandfathering” transactions entered into prior to reforms, and offering very specific temporary tax sweeteners. Transition relief is a valuable tool to use in
crafting tax reforms, but its application is often haphazard in practice and there remains
the important and unresolved question of exactly what purpose transition should serve.
The usual goal of transition relief is to reduce or reverse the negative consequences
of tax reform for certain affected groups. If such relief were surgically designed and
globally applied then in concept one could reform an inefficient tax system in a way
that made nobody worse off and many people better off — though of course this is
unrealistic. Practical design limitations make it impossible to tailor relief in this way, so
transition relief typically is an effort to go part of the way toward reducing new burdens
on affected taxpayers. In the process transition relief also dispenses benefits to some
taxpayers who are winners from tax reform, and will typically undermine tax reform
goals by watering down the impact of reform provisions and reducing tax collections.
It is important to recognize that there are two separate sources of loss that taxpayers
may experience in a reform. The first is that the terms of the tax system turn against them:
tax rates in their brackets increase; deductions or credits from which they previously
benefitted are curtailed or eliminated; the reform changes prices in a way that reduces
their real incomes. The second source of loss is failure to anticipate the reform, as when
a reform unexpectedly depresses after-tax returns to prior investments. The first source
of loss consists of changes that make taxpayers worse off than they would have been
if the prior tax regime had continued, and even if they knew that the tax change was
coming; whereas the second source of loss derives from the dashing of expectations.
Individuals save for retirement, buy homes, invest in municipal bonds, and take new
jobs on the basis of expectations over the after-tax returns to these actions, only to find
the returns potentially greatly altered by a tax reform. Had they known the tax reform
was coming they would not have made the same decisions.
These two sources of loss can be distinguished by denoting taxpayer i’s utility level
as Vi p, p e , in which p is a vector of tax provisions, and pe represents the provisions

(

)
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that had been expected. Let p1 denote tax provisions prior to a reform, and p2 the tax
provisions introduced by the reform. If taxpayer i had fully anticipated the pre-reform
provisions (possibly because they had been in place a long time), his or her utility
prior to the reform was Vi p1 , p1e . If the government unexpectedly introduces the tax
reform while everyone still expects tax provisions p1 to prevail, then individual i’s utility
becomes Vi p2 , p1e . The utility change introduced by the reform can be decomposed as:

(

(5)

(

(

)

)

(

)

) (

) (

)

(

) (

)

Vi p2 , p1e − Vi p1 , p1e = Vi p2 , p2e − Vi p1 , p1e  + Vi p2 , p1e − Vi p2 , p2e  ,

the left side of which is the reform-induced change in individual i’s utility. The first
bracketed term on the right side of equation (5) is the change in utility attributable to
moving from a fully-anticipated tax regime with provisions p1 to a fully-anticipated
tax regime with provisions p2. And the second bracketed term is the change in utility
due to the dashing of expectations: that the reform introduced provisions p2 while the
world expected p1.
The issue for transition relief is whether it is intended to compensate taxpayers for
the change in their welfare due to the tax change, in which case the relevant measure is
the sum of both terms on the right side of equation (5), or whether instead it is intended
to compensate taxpayers only for the unanticipated nature of the reform, in which case
the relevant measure is only the second bracketed term on the right side of equation (5).
There is an excellent case to be made for the latter — that governments should
implement transition relief to compensate for the welfare effects that tax reform has
in defying expectations, but not for changing the tax system per se. Gains and losses
due to defiance of expectations are short term in nature and largely attributable to the
operation of political machinery. Instead of offering the economy a plan for the future,
the tax system is subject to shifting political forces and as a result cannot commit to
future tax provisions. True, changing economic and social conditions will mandate tax
changes even from an optimizing government capable of commitment — but such a
government would at least be able to commit to tax principles, with implied contingencies upon which the market could rely. In compensating taxpayers in whole or in
part for gains and losses due to expectations,6 the government adjusts tax obligations
in acknowledgment that its own inability to offer statutory commitments should not
form the basis of tax collections — and as a method of committing not to exploit the
unexpected nature of future changes.
By contrast, much of the discussion of transition relief concentrates on both components of the right side of equation (5), the entire effect of tax reform on affected parties.7

6

7

It is noteworthy that taxpayers and the market may anticipate the possibility of tax changes even in what
e
otherwise appears to be a stable environment. As a result, in equation (5) one might replace p1e with p 1*
,
e
where p 1*
is the expectation of future tax policy while provisions p1 are in place.
See, for example, those such as Graetz (1977, 1985), Kaplow (1986), and Levmore (1993), who argue
against most forms of transition relief; and Feldstein (1976a, 1976b), Zodrow (1981), Ramsayer and
Nakazato (1989), and Logue (1996), who offer arguments in favor of relief; Shaviro (2000) suggests that
the government provide relief for some tax transitions and not others.
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This appears to be motivated by a desire to craft reforms that would keep taxpayers
whole. There are three possible motives for such compensation, the first of which is
to reduce certain adverse economic effects of tax changes. Investors and others whose
economic actions have lasting consequences are subject to the risk that tax policy may
change before returns are fully realized. Transition relief mitigates or eliminates this risk,
which reduces its effects on individual welfare and thereby encourages investment. But
since transition relief is financed by taxpayers as a whole, its function in reducing the
risks of parties potentially affected by tax reform really consists of shifting these risks
onto others, with resulting implications for their welfares and investment decisions.
The second motivation for transition relief is that taxpayers are normatively entitled to
whatever welfare they enjoyed prior to reform. It is difficult to understand the possible
basis of this entitlement. Certainly theories of efficient and equitable taxation make no
allowance for prior tax systems, and indeed if they did one could point to earlier eras
in which governments were tiny and none had income taxes, suggesting that taxpayers would need to be compensated for having to pay taxes at all, which would mean
the system raises no revenue.8 It is certainly undesirable to enact reforms that reduce
welfare, and if the welfare reductions were widespread then obviously such reforms are
unlikely to have favorable welfare properties. But it is quite another thing to say that
having once favored a group in the population with relatively generous tax provisions
the government must offer at least partial compensation for removing these provisions in
the future. This grants far too much normative significance to past government actions.
The third motivation for compensating those who lose from a tax reform is political,
consisting of concerns about future elections and the dynamics of enacting beneficial
reforms that might be blocked by interests that oppose them. Such political motivations
are entirely understandable, and they join other political considerations in motivating
the composition not only of tax policies but also of any other policies produced by the
democratic process. One should not let this political reality obscure an understanding
of the substantive economic goals of tax reform, even though in practice both will
contribute to the design of the final tax reform product. Tax reform works best when it
starts from principles and proceeds to provisions.
A commitment to offering transition relief to compensate those adversely affected
by the unexpected nature of tax reform has the benefit of reducing concerns about
possible future reforms,9 though it should be noted that even such a policy would not
remove taxpayer incentives to try to anticipate tax reforms, because relief inevitably is
applied to groups of taxpayers and not conditioned on the beliefs of any individuals.
8

9

Taxes are used to finance government expenditures, so one could imagine trying to compensate taxpayers
for their tax burdens net of benefits of government spending. But such a procedure leads directly to a system
of taxing according to government benefits, with all of its limitations and difficulties of even defining how
much someone benefits from government spending.
Transition relief presumably is symmetric, with taxpayers who benefit from the unanticipated aspects of
reforms subject to transition provisions that claw back some or all of the gains they would otherwise enjoy
from the surprise elements.
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The primary reason to offer transition relief is to remove the government’s temptation
to enact unanticipated tax changes. There is a constant incentive to do so, because tax
policies that rely on aspects of past behavior have otherwise-desirable incentive properties stemming from the fact that individuals and firms cannot respond to new tax rules
by changing their past behavior. But anticipation of the possibility of such government
action discourages investment and other beneficial economic activities even in the
absence of rent-seeking tax reform.
It is difficult to design transition rules that would offer relief closely approximating
any suggested by different theories of tax transitions.10 The difficulties lie first in determining the effects of tax reforms on different population groups, and second in crafting
transitional rules that deliver commensurate compensation. Both are challenging; and
in the case of evaluating tax reform effects there is a question of how to handle differences among taxpayers in the same treatment group in the extent to which they are
affected by tax reforms. Practices such as phased-in application of new tax rules may
dampen the effect of tax reforms on asset prices, but do so at the cost of perpetuating
aspects of old tax law that reforms are designed to supplant. The reality is that no tax
reform transition relief is perfect, which is why governments tend to offer such relief
in piecemeal fashion.
Tax reforms create winners and losers, including those who win or lose because tax
reforms were not perfectly anticipated. Transition relief addresses some aspects of these
gains and losses, but there is considerable controversy over the appropriate objectives
of transition relief, and acknowledgment that, whatever their objectives, transition
rules deliver only very imperfect relief. Frequent tax reforms produce frequent transitions, and therefore frequent occasions for imperfect and costly transition relief. This
is part of the cost of tax reform, and implies that a cost-minimizing strategy is one of
infrequent reform with considerable attention to the objectives, design and details of
accompanying transition relief. While recent practice may not be encouraging in this
regard, there is ample scope for principles-based transition relief that improves tax reform
outcomes and incentives. The critical element in designing such transition relief is to
apply the same sound principles that adhere to tax policy generally, and that therefore
can be properly anticipated by economic actors. Doing so holds forth the prospect of
significantly easing transitions while also advancing longer-term tax reform objectives.
V. TAX REFORM FREQUENCY
It is forever tempting to reform the tax system because taxes are chronically in need
of reform. Legislators in every era find that prior efforts to craft tax legislation have
fallen short due to incomplete or misguided objectives, design that was compromised
to meet political demands, and circumstances and needs that subsequently changed.
10

Zodrow (1981, 1985), Shaviro (2000), and Kaplow (2003, 2008) consider the properties of different
methods of transition relief to accompany tax changes.
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Every country’s taxes could be improved, and should a government one day and against
all odds adopt an ideal tax system, changing economic and social conditions would
shortly make even it out of date and in need of further reform. So there are clear benefits
to be had in implementing beneficial reforms, perhaps even on a regular basis. But in
evaluating the proper frequency of reform it is necessary to balance the potential gains
against the costs.
An important cost of new tax legislation is that it conveys the government’s ability
and willingness to change its tax system, raising the specter of additional reform in the
near future. Tax reforms with insufficient transition relief can subject past investors to
windfall losses in the form of reduced after-tax returns to existing investments, and
anticipation of this possibility has a chilling effect on new investment. The investments
that are potentially at risk include not only property, plant and equipment expenditures,
but also resources devoted to forming business organizations; occupational, locational,
and educational choices; and other economic decisions that are not easily reversed.
Consequently governments that are unable to commit not to exploit sunk investments
risk discouraging wide ranges of important economic activity.
Governments must balance these and other costs of frequent reforms, including the
costs of using the political system to pass new legislation, against the benefits of sensibly
updating their tax systems. One of the ways in which tax systems become stale is that
taxpayers find previously-overlooked loopholes and develop other unanticipated methods of tax avoidance. Once these become widely used or at least widely publicized, the
associated revenue erosion, resource diversion, and taxpayer inequity creates a desire
to change the laws in a way that closes loopholes and otherwise reduces tax avoidance
opportunities. Since this is a continuous process, it generates continual demand for tax
reform. But the downside of closing loopholes is that the government thereby indirectly
encourages taxpayers to devote resources to finding and developing new ones, with
associated economic loss.11
Tax avoidance can be costly in two senses, the first of which is that the government
collects less tax revenue from tax avoiders. This type of self-help tax cut may represent
an arbitrary and inefficient reallocation of tax burdens, particularly if it is not directed at
marginal returns and therefore does not stimulate significant additional economic activity.
The second cost is that taxpayers devote resources to avoiding taxes, both in the form
of tax planning expenses and in the form of restructuring and in some cases foregoing
otherwise-profitable business opportunities in order to maximize tax advantages. It is
convenient to summarize government policy by a parameter c that is positively related
to the cost of tax avoidance, with the cost of any given level of tax avoidance increasing
11

Studies that consider appropriate balancing of the costs and benefits of government measures to prevent
tax avoidance include Weisbach (2002a, 2002b, 2007), Hines (2004), Curry, Hill, and Parisi (2007, 2014),
and Konrad (2017). The costs of reduced tax collections from avoidance can be inferred in part from the
costs of collecting taxes in the first place, as estimated using the methods of Harberger (1964a, 1964b) and
Slemrod and Sorum (1984).

Perils of Tax Reform

371

in c; more frequent loophole-closing tax reform has the effect of increasing c. A taxpayer
chooses a tax avoidance level a c corresponding to his or her under-declared income,
with a ′ c < 0 . A taxpayer’s total resource cost of tax avoidance is given by T c , l
is the government’s valuation of its loss per dollar of tax avoidance, and t is the tax
rate. Finally, the government incurs a cost kc associated with a tax reform frequency
sufficient to sustain a tax avoidance cost parameter c.
From the standpoint of the government the total social cost of tax avoidance and
enforcement, including resource costs incurred by taxpayers, is given by:

()

()

(6)

()

()

()

T c + λτ a c + kc.

Minimizing equation (6) over the choice of c implies:
(7)

()

()

T ′ c + λτ a′ c + k = 0.

In interpreting equation (7) it is helpful to consider a simple example. If the total
(tax-deductible) avoidance cost an individual faces is given by the quadratic function
T c = γ ca 2 , with g > 0 a parameter related to the costliness of avoidance, then a
1
rational individual who chooses a to maximize τ  a − γ ca 2  will select a =
,
2γ c
−1
reflecting that avoidance declines as it becomes more costly. It follows that a′ c =
,
2γ c 2
−1
, and equation (7) implies:
T′ c =
4γ c 2

()

()

()

1

(8)

 1 + 2λτ  2
c=
 .
 4γ k 

Expression (8) indicates that the cost-minimizing value of the government-chosen
tax parameter c is an increasing function of lt , which is the welfare cost of reduced
tax collections from an increment of under-declared income. While a higher welfare
cost of tax avoidance increases the return to discouraging avoidance and thus prompts
the government to choose a higher value of c, it is noteworthy that c is positive even
if l = 0, as part of the cost of tax avoidance consists of the resource costs that taxpayers incur in avoiding taxes, and these costs are unaffected by l. Additionally, c is a
decreasing function of both g and k. The effect of g reflects that c and g are substitutes
from the standpoint of discouraging tax avoidance, whereas the effect of k captures
the welfare cost of the frequent tax reforms that would support a high value of c. As
k shrinks toward zero, c increases without bound, since this example has the property
that in the absence of costly policy the government would seek to raise the cost of tax
avoidance sufficiently to drive out the practice. This outcome is not, however, intrinsic
to those characterized by equation (7), as there are other cases in which even with
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k = 0 the government will choose to permit significant tax avoidance rather than introduce
measures that would require taxpayers to incur much higher costs to maintain portions
of their prior avoidance levels.
The realization that taxpayers have discovered significant tax avoidance methods can
serve as a powerful spur to tax reform, notwithstanding the reality that removing some
tax avoidance opportunities immediately sets taxpayers in search of others. Expression
(8) serves as a reminder that optimal policy strikes a balance between the costliness
of tax reform and the benefits of limiting avoidance, so that prudent governments may
need to condition themselves to living with a certain amount of tax base erosion rather
than seeking new measures to block every effort as it appears. Tax reform is costly
because it discourages desirable economic activity, encourages undesirable activity,
and consumes political resources in the course of introducing new legislation with its
own quirks and flaws. Properly modulated and directed, however, the desire to reform
a country’s taxes can be channeled into highly beneficial legislation that is periodically
updated to capture new developments. Hence the benefits to adhering to sound principles
appear in the timing as well as the substance of tax reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of new tax legislation is usually accompanied by grand claims for
its salutary effects on the economy, its virtuous consequences for the distribution of
income, and the revenue it will raise. Tax reform advocates and backers advance these
claims not only to marshal popular support but also because they believe them. Time
and again tax reforms have failed to achieve their stated goals and have fallen short of
their potentials, often falling prey to the perils of overstating projected revenue, failing to focus on efficiency and equity objectives, offering insufficient and misdirected
transition relief, and distorting incentives for investment and tax avoidance. And it is
not only political actors who are disappointed; scholars and pundits regularly call for
tax reform, only to express dismay at what subsequently emerges.
It need not be this way. Principled and thoughtful reform offers the opportunity to
sidestep many of these perils while nonetheless achieving tax reform objectives. The
solution to the tax reform challenge lies in enacting provisions based on sound and
generally shared principles, with the understanding that details of implementation
may change in the future but the principles, if they change, will evolve much more
slowly. Tax reform enacted on a bipartisan basis and following a careful deliberative
process is the most likely to provide revenue adequacy, appropriate transition relief,
and properly designed tax provisions on a timetable that offers taxpayers efficient
incentives. Unprincipled tax reform is perilous any time it is attempted, raising the
question of why any government would want to seek such a reform, given the available
and much more attractive alternative of applying shared principles to craft a better tax
system.
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